Loterre: SAGE: state compliance with international law

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state compliance with international law

One of the major questions in the research on international institutions, as stated by Robert Keohane (1984), has been “why governments, seeking to promote their own interests, ever comply with the rules of international regimes when they view these rules as in conflict with … their myopic self-interest.” While realists argue that states simply do not comply if the costs of a rule are too high, rational institutionalists point to the role of international regimes and organizations, whose monitoring, sanctioning, and adjudication mechanisms increase the costs of noncompliance. In contrast to these enforcement approaches, management theories assume that noncompliance is involuntary and results from a lack of resources and, therefore, focus on capacity-building and rule specification. [Source: The Encyclopedia of Political Science; State Compliance with International Law]

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